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STATUTORY RESPONSES TO INTERESTED
DIRECTORS' TRANSACTIONS:
A WATERING DOWN OF FIDUCIARY STANDARDS?
Ahmed Bulbulia*
Arthur R. Pinto**
I. Introduction
Twenty-seven states' have enacted statutory provisions dealing with in-
terested directors'2 transactions or contracts.3 California was one of the first
states to enact such a provision4 and most of the statutes are modelled upon or
similar to the California section.'
* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law Center, LLB 1965, London
School of Economics, LLM 1967, University of Michigan Law School.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Seton University Law Center, A.B. 1969, Colgate Univer-
sity, J.D. 1972, New York University Law School.
1 ARuz. Rav. STAT. ANN § 10-041 (Supp. 1975); CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West Supp.
1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-323 (1960); DEL. Cona ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (1975); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 607.124 (West Supp. 1975); GA. CODE.ANN. § 22-716 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO
CODE § 30-142 (1967); IND. CODE § 23-1-10-6 (Burn 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6304
(1974); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.205 (Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:84
(West Supp. 1976); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A § 717 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE § 2-419
(Supp. 1976); MIcE. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 450.1545 (1973); Miss. ICODE ANN. § 79-3-67
(1972); NV. REv. STAT. § 78.140 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-8 (Supp. 1976); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney Supp. 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-30 (1975); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15 § 1409.1 (Purdon Supp. 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 7-1.1-37.1 (1970); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 12-18.16 (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-816 (Supp. 1974); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11 § 1888 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-39.1 (Supp. 1975); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
31-1-25 (Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.355 (West Supp. 1975).
2 Some states have included officers under the purview of the statutes. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-716 (Supp. 1975), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15§ 1400.3 (Purdon Supp. 1976).
3 This article will not attempt to deal with those statutory provisions which may validate
or invalidate specific transactions or contracts between interested directors or officers and their
corporations. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 143 (1975) and MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. 2d § 47 (1971) dealing with loans to directors or officers. This article, however,
focuses upon transactions between a corporation and a director, and upon transactions between
two corporations, with directors common to both.
4 West Virginia and Rhode Island had statutory provisions predating the California
statute but they have not served as a model for other states.
5 Although California has recently revised its corporation's law and its sfatutory provision
on interested directors' transactions (See CAL. CORP. CODE § 310, 132-156), reference in
the article to the California model will mean CAL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 820 (West 1955) which
provides:
Duty to act in good faith, effect of personal financial interest or common director-
ship. Directors and officers shall exercise their powers in good faith, and with a
view to the interests of the corporation. No contract of other transaction between a
corporation and one or more of its directors, or between a corporation and any
corporation, firm, or association in which one or more of its directors are directors or
are financially interested, is either void or voidable because such director or directors
are present at the meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which
authorizes or approves the contract or transaction, or because his or their votes are
counted for such purpose, if the circumstances specified in any of the following sub-
divisions exist:
(a) The fact of the common directorship or financial interest is disclosed or
known to the board or directors or committee and noted in the minutes, and the
board of committee authorizes, approves, or ratifies the contract or transaction in
good faith by a vote sufficient for the purpose without counting the vote or votes of
such director or directors.
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These statutes specify the methods to enter into such transactions. Such
transactions are permissible: 1) if approved by the board or shareholders, or 2)
if the transaction is found to be fair. Since the statutes are phrased in the dis-
junctive, the question arises as to whether board or shareholder approval elimi-
nates the consideration of the substantive fairness of the transaction. If fairness
is eliminated, it would be a significant departure from traditional concepts of
fiduciary duty. Given the importance of state law because of the recent re-
luctance of the Supreme Court to use federal securities law as a means of insur-
ing fiduciary duty6 and the possible broad scope of these statutes,7 the elimination
of substantive fairness by these statutes would remove an important protection for
shareholders. This article will analyze the California model and its progeny8 in
an attempt to suggest a resolution of this issue.
II. The Common Law View
The common law view of interested directors' contracts or transactions has a
varied history.' Early American courts' ° followed the traditional English rule"
and held such contracts or transactions to be voidable at the option of the
corporation. The underlying rationale for this rule was that directors, as
fiduciaries, 2 have a duty of loyalty and therefore their interests should not con-
flict with those of the corporation. There was no inquiry into the fairness of the
contract or transaction.13 This rule was also applied to transactions between
(b) The fact of the common directorship or financial interest is disclosed or
known to the shareholders, and they approve or ratify the contract or transaction in
good faith by a majority vote or written consent of shareholders entitled to vote.
(c) The contract or transaction is just and reasonable as to the corporation at
the time it is authorized or approved.
Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of a
quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which autho-
rizes, approves, or ratifies a contract or transaction.
6 Green v. Sante Fe Industries, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977).
7 See note 33 infra.
8 All but three of the states (IDAHO CODE § 30-142 (1967); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-67
(1972); and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 § 1888 (1973)) found in note 1 supra, resemble Califor-
nia's model by using the alternative approach of board approval; shareholders approval or
fairness.
9 See Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22
Bus. LAW. 35 (1966), for an excellent analysis of the common law principles [hereinafter cited
as MARSH].
10 Id. at 36; W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 917
(rev. perm. ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER].
11 See Aberdeen Ry. v. Blaikie Bros., 1854 [IMACQ 461]; L. GOWER, THE PRINCIPLES OF
MODERN COMPANY LAW 478-79 (2d. ed. 1957).
12 Munson v. Syracuse Geneva and Corneng R. R. Co., 103 N.Y. 58, 73, 8 N.E. 355,
358 (1886). See H. BALLANTINE, ON CORPORATIONS § 66 (rev. ed. 1946) [hereinafter cited
as BALLANTINE]. Some courts have analogized directors to trustees and have found the contracts
to be voidable. See, e.g., Knox Class Bottle Company v. Underwood, 228 Miss. 699, 89 So.2d
799 (1956). See Sealy, The Director As Trustee, 1967 CAMB. L. J. 83 (1967), which distin-
guishes corporate directors from trustees. Other courts have compared directors to "agents"
who cannot self-deal with their principals. See, e.g., Wardell v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 103
U.S. 651 (1880). However, directors who act in their individual capacities generally are not
viewed as agents. BALLANTINE at § 44. But see Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marburry, 91 U.S. 328
(1876) which utilized both the trustee and agent rationale to void the contract.
13 It [the law] does not stop to inquire whether the contract or transaction was fair
or unfair. It stops the inquiry when the relation is disclosed, and sets aside the
the transaction, or refuses to enforce it, at the instance of the party when the
fiduciary undertook to represent, without undertaking to deal with the question of
abstract justice in the particular case.
Munson, supra note 12, at 74.
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corporations with common directors (interlocking boards)."4
A variety of reasons was offered by the early courts for this rule. One reason
typically advanced was that since directors stand in a fiduciary relationship to the
corporation, they cannot adequately represent both themselves and the corpora-
tion." In other words, the corporation is entitled to representation by all the
directors using their unbiased judgment.'
Courts have also indicated that when interests of the individual director
conflicted with a duty he owed to the corpoiation, it was assumed that the
director would favor his own interest.' In addition, the disinterested directors
representing the corporation may inevitably be influenced by their co-director
and that influence is difficult if not impossible to evaluate."8
A weakening of the early inflexible rule began as the courts accepted the
idea that a majority of the disinterested directors could approve the agreement
on behalf of the corporation, provided that the contract was fair.' Courts were
initially more willing to depart from the inflexible rule in the case of transactions
between interlocking boards. This resulted from a judicial recognition of the
trend in modem business of intercorporate relationships and the prevalence of
directors serving on more than one board."
This modernized version of the rule validating contracts approved by a dis-
14 MARSH, supra note 9, at 37-38. The rule also extended to parent-subsidiary relation-
ships even in the absence of common directors. Id. at 38. See generally Note, The Fiduciary
Duty of Parent to Subsidiary Corporations, 57 VA. L. REV. 1223 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
VIRGINIA NOTE].
15 Note, Legal Safeguards About Transactions Between A Director and his Corporation,
83 U. PA. L. REv. 56, 57 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Note, Legal Safeguards].
16 BALLANTINE, supra note 46, at 171.
17 In Smith v. Pacific Vinegar & Pickle Works, 145 Col. 352, 78 P. 550, 554 (1904), the
court states:
The philosophy of this rule is quite apparent, and its inflexibility is the strongest
safeguard which the law can offer for the protection of the interests of the beneficiary.
The great purpose of the law is to secure fidelity in the agent. When one undertakes
to deal with himself in different capacities-individual and representative-there is
a manifest hostility in the position he occupies. His duty calls upon him to act for
the best interests of his principal. His self-interest prompts him to make the best
bargain for himself. Humanity is so constituted that, when these conflicting interests
arise, the temptation is usually too great to be overcome, and duty is sacrificed to
interest. In order that this temptation may be avoided, or, if indulged in, must be
at the peril of the trustee, it has been wisely provided that the trustee shall not be
permitted to make or enforce any contract arising between himself as trustee and
individually with reference to any matter of the trust, nor will the court enter into
any exmination of the honesty of the transaction.
18 In Munson, supra note 12, at 358, the court explains:
[The law] cannot accurately measure the influence of a trustee with his associ-
ates nor will it enter into the inquiry, in an action by the trustee in his private
capacity to enforce the contract, in the making of which he participated. The value
of the rule of equity to which we have adverted, lies, to a great extent, in its stub-
bornness and inflexibility. Its rigidity gives it one of its chief uses as a preventive
or discouraging influence, because it weakens the temptation to dishonesty or unfair
dealing on the part of the trustees, vitiating, without attempt at discrimination, all
transactions in which they assume the dual characters of principal and representative.
19 MARSH, supra note 9, at 40 n.18, and cases cited therein. The rationale for this rule
was that a trustee could deal directly with the cestui qui trust if he took no advantage of his
position, and he made full disclosure, and the transaction was fair and reasonable. Thus a
director also should be able to deal similarly. Id. at 41. See also 2 SCOTT ON TRUSTS 1275-76
(2d. ed. 1956).
20 Note, Restrictions on the Power of a Director to Contract with His Corporation, 29
COL. L. REv. 338, 345-46 (1929). See also, Note, The Validity of Contract Between Corpora-
tions with Common Directors, 51 HARv. L. REv. 327 (1937).
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interested majority, however, had its own rigid aspects. Some courts would not
inquire into fairness to validate the transaction when the interested director was
himself necessary either to constitute a quorum of the board or to constitute a
majority to authorize the transaction." This disinterested quorum rule was some-
times found inapplicable to interlocking boards.2" Some state courts eventually
abandoned the disinterested quorum requirement in all cases, leaving only an
inquiry into fairness.2"
Thus the common law moved from the traditional inflexible rule with its
certainty of application, 4 to a more flexible but uncertain approach involving
questions of fairness. This change has been justified in several ways.
The Supreme Court, for example, felt that it was desirable for those closely
associated with a corporation to assist it, since those individuals would be the
most interested and the "best qualified to judge of the necessity of that aid, and
of the extent to which it may safely be given."" It has also been argued that
the "exigencies of modern business" necessarily justified a change in the rule. 6
But as one leading commentator points out,
One searches in vain in the decided cases for a reasoned defense of this
change in legal philosophy, or for the slightest attempt to refute the powerful
arguments which had been made in support of the previous rule. Did the
courts discover in the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century that greed was
no longer a factor in human conduct? If so, they did not share the basis of
this discovery with the public; nor did they humbly admit their error when
confronted with the next wave of corporate frauds arising out of the era
of the formation of the "trusts" during the 1890's and early 1900's.2
7
III. Statutory Responses
The common law has moved from a predictable standard which rendered
transactions with interested directors voidable at the option of the corporation to
a more flexible, but uncertain standard, under which these transactions are valid,
only if they are found to be fair. In 1931, California adopted a general statute
dealing with these transactions. 2  While the statutory provision was designed to
21 Comment, Dealings Between Directors and Their Corporations-A Discussion of the
"Disinterested Quorum" Rule Under Present Statutory Limitations in Michigan, 34 U. DET.
L.J. 42 (1956).
22 See, e.g., Robotham v. Prudential Insurance Co., 64 N.J. EQ. 673, 53 A. 842 (Ch. 1903).
LATTIN, supra note 9, at S931.
23 MARSH, supra note 9, at 43-44; FLETCHER, supra note 9, at S931. Most of the statutory
provisions in note 1, supra, concern the necessity of an interested director's vote or his presence
at a directors' meeting for the purposes of a quorum. Generally, these provisions allow the
interested director's vote and allow his presence to be counted toward quorum.
24 LATTIN, supra note 10, at 291.
25 Twin Lick, supra note 12, at 330; BALLANTINE, supra note 12, at 173.
26 Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law, 19 CAL. L. REV.
465, 476 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Ballantine, Questions of Policy].
27 MARSH, supra note 9, at 40.
28 CAL. CIv. CODE § 311 enacted in 1931 was amended in 1933 and then amended and
retitled CAL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 820 in 1947. It was amended and retitled CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 310 in 1977. Each of these changes prior to 1977 involved changes in language but did not
change the basic effect of the statute. For a discussion of the 1977 changes, see text accompany-
ing notes 134-58 infra.
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deal with the common law in the area which had developed in California,2" it has
greater significance since many states have enacted similar provisions or have
relied heavily upon the California statute as a model." Thus, unless there is a
clear deviation from the California model, or legislative history in a given state
indicates contrary intent, California's rationale and case law development should
afford insight into the effect of similar statutes in other states."1
A. The California Model
Former section 820 of the California Corporation Code32 (the "California
Model") provided in essence that contracts or transactions" between a corpora-
tion and its directors' 4 (either directly or indirectly through an interlocking board
29 Ballantine, Questions of Policy, supra note 26, at 475; Comment, Corporations: Effect of
Director's Adverse Interest or Conflicting Duties to Invalidate Contracts: California Civil Code
Section 311, 29 CAL. L. REV. 480 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Corporations].
30 See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. 2d § 41 at 842; Commissioners' Comment,
20 N.J.S.A. 14A:6-8 (West Supp. 1976).
31 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 329-37 (4th ed. Sands, 1973);
BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAws 597-604 (2d ed. 1911). It is not
necessary for the statute in question to be identical to the California model, nor is it necessary
for the state legislature to manifest a clear intent to follow California in the formulation of the
statute.
32 See note 5 supra for the text of statute in full. Former CAL. CORP. CODE § 820 has
generally served as the model for the other statutes, in terms of both statutory language and as
a guide for interpretation.
33 All the statutes use the term "transactions." The use of the term transaction significantly
expands the coverage of the statutes. It is a term broader in scope than the term contract.
United States Hoffman Mach. Corp. v. Eberstein, 150 Kan. 790, 96 P.2d 661, 663 (1940).
Transaction could include "an act or agreement . . . having some connection with each other,
in which more than one person is concerned, and by which the legal relations of such persons
between themselves are altered." Baker v. S. A. Healy Co. 302 Ill. App. 634, 24 N.E.2d 228,
234. Thus the statute covers not only the usual contractual relationship contemplated in the
common law but may include situations when the director unilaterally acts which adversely
affects his corporation, e.g., a dissolution. Northway Inc. v. TSC Industries, Inc., 361 F. Supp.
108, 115 (1973). It may also apply to sale of control; dividend policy; and recapitalization3.
See MARSH supra note 9, at 57-65. It may also apply to corporate opportunities usurped by
directors. Cf. FOLK, infra note 48, at 92-93. There has been a recent trend of going private
transactions where minority shareholders have been frozen out of their corporation. Those
transactions often involve board action with actual or potential conflicts of interest. See gener-
ally, Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975). Thus, compliance with the statute and
an inquiry into fairness may be required. Cf. Folk letter dated July 19, 1973 found in North-
way Inc. v. TSC Industry, 512 F.2d 324, 337, n.27 (7th Cir. 1975). The use of other statutory
provisions to effectuate going private, such as merger provisions with appraisal rights, should not
preclude an inquiry into fairness. Cf. Singer v. Magnavox, N.Y.L.J. 5, 6 (Del. Supp. Ct. Oct.
4, 1977). Given the broad definition of transaction, a court conceivably could read the statute
into manv othor situations.
34 The California model covers transactions with directors. Although the statute does not
specifically deal with transactions between shareholders, who are not directors, and their cor-
poration, it is possible to argue that they are also covered. If they are controlling shareholders,
the transactions may be reached under the theory that the directors are in reality puppets
of the shareholders. Cf. Zahn v. Transamerica Corporation, 162 F.2d 36 (3rd Cir. 1947), or
that they were deputized. (Cf. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962)), or under the theory of
de facto directors. H. HENN, LAw OF CORPORATIONS § 206 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HENN].
In addition, the model does not deal with the problems of transactions with relatives of direc-
tors or the voting of relatives as directors on transactions with their relative who is a co-
director. At the common law, courts scrutinized such transactions and should continue to do
so under the statute. Knox Glass Bottle Co. v. Underwood, 228 Miss. 699; 89 So. 2d 799
(1956); Imberman v. Alexander, 16 Misc. 2d 330, 184 N.Y.S. 2d 801 (1959). See Kendrick,
Interested Director in Texas, 21 S.W.L.J. 794, 798 (1967); Sarner v. Fox Hill, 199 A. 2d 6
(1964) (an attorney was disqualified). See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-323 (1960), which
specifically includes spouse, parents and children as interested under the statute.
[Vol. 53:201]
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of a corporation in which the directors are financially interested) 5 are neither
void nor voidable'6 because the directors are present or voting on the transaction
if any of three circumstances have occurred: (1) disclosure of the common
directorship or financial interest to the disinterested directors who in good faith
and sufficient number3 7 approve the transaction ;"8 or (2) a similar disclosure to
the shareholders who in good faith approve the contract;39 or (3) the contract is
"just and reasonable as to the corporation at the time it is authorized or ap-
proved."4
The language is clearly disjunctive in that all that is required under the
statute is "any one of the following" circumstances (emphasis added)." On its
face, the statute seems to allow enforcement of an unjust and unreasonable
contract,42 as long as the board of directors or shareholders approved the transac-
tion pursuant to the statute.4 Thus, it would appear that the statute has elimi-
35 The statute is not limited to interlocking boards but also includes firms or associations
in which the director is interested.
36 Although the statute does not indicate who may void the transaction, at common law
the corporation was deemed to have the requisite interest to pursue such an action. It is
doubtful whether this approach is changed by the statute. See FLETCnER, supra note 10, §
977 at 493-94.
37 The California model provides that common or interested directors may be counted in
determining the presence of the quorum of the board. Approval by the board must however
be by a vote "sufficient for such purpose without counting the vote or votes of such director
or directors." Section 820 (a). The provision leaves a variety of questions unanswered. For
example, if the board consists of twelve members of which three directors are interested and
attend the meeting and only five of the nine disinterested directors attend the meeting; if
all vote in favor of the transaction, is their approval under the statute? There is a quorum
which normally requires a majority, i.e., seven directors. Does "sufficient" approval require five
disinterested directors, i.e., a majority of the directors present, or three disinterested directors,
i.e., a majority of the quorum; or three disinterested directors, i.e., a majority of the disinterested
directors present and voting? See Arsht & Stapleton, Delaware General Corporation Law, 25.
Bus. LAW 287, 290 (1969). These questions have not been resolved by the California courts.
See Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement. 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260 P.2d 823, 830 (1953). Since
the statute is unclear, a court consistent with the idea of limiting conflicts of interest may
require the more difficult requirement of a majority of disinterested directors present. See note
79 infra, for a discussion of the variation to this requirement in Delaware.
38 CAL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 820 (a) (West 1955).
39 Id. at § 820 (b).
40 Id. at § 820 (c).
41 All the statutes following the California model (except Michigan, Nevada and Virginia)
substitute this language with "or" between the subsections dealing with shareholder or board
approval. See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 144, cited in full at note 76 infra. Originally,
California used the disjunctive "or," but replaced it with the language in § 820 in 1947, and
now uses "or" again. See note 134 insra, for the text of CAL. CIv. CODE § 310. We are unable
to find any legislative history or case law which indicates that this change was significant.
42 California and North Carolina are the only states which use the terms "just and reason-
able" in the statute. All the others deviate from the California model and use a term with
the word "fair." There seems to be no basis for distinguishing between "just and reasonable"
and "fair" thus they should be equated. See Remillard Brick Co. it. Dandini Co., 109 Cal.
App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952).
43 A similar issue is whether Cal. Gen. Corp. Law Sec. 820 (c) would validate a fair
contract which does not comply with subsections (a) or (b). See text accompanying notes
67-69 infra. Cf. Caminetti v. Prudence Mutual Life Ins. Ass'n, 62 Cal. App. 2d 945, 146
P.2d 15, 18 (1944). But see Scott v. Multi-Amp. Corporation, 386 F. Supp. 44, 67 (D.N.J.
1974). In Scott, the court held that all three subsections must be satisfied for a valid contract
under New Jersey's adaptation of the California Model; N.J.S.A. 14A: 6-8. The court cites
Israels, The Corporate Triangle-Same Corporate Aspects of the New Jersey, New York and
Delaware Statutes, 23 RUT. L. REv. 615, 627 (1969) and Remillard, supra note 40. Both
indicate that fairness is required in addition to shareholder or board approval under the
statute. Although this would seem contrary to the disjunctive nature of the statute, neither
suggests the Scott holding that one needs shareholder approval, board approval and fairness for
all interested directors' transactions. In fact, in Remillard the court did not find majority
['December 1977]
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nated the requirement of fairness and correspondingly lowered the fiduciary re-
sponsibility of directors who deal with their own corporations.4 4 If fairness is
eliminated as an overriding principle by the statute, it would be a significant
departure from the common law which has always required fairness. All that
would then be required under the California model is disclosure of the director's
interest to the board and shareholders and approval pursuant to the statute.
Thus, minimum disclosure would become the substitute for fairness.4"
Twenty-three states have enacted statutes which substantially conform to
the California model of using a disjunctive approach requiring board or share-
holder approval or fairness. 6 Different views have been expressed by the com-
mentators on whether fairness is an overriding principle under these statutes.
Most commentators argue for the continued use of fairness notwithstanding the
disjunctive approach of the statute while others advocate that fairness has been
expressly eliminated."
The first case to deal with the question of fairness in the context of the
California model was Remillard Brick Co. v. Dandini Co.49 Remillard Brick Co.
(wholly owned by a Lillian Dandini), a minority shareholder of Remillard-
Dandini Co., brought a derivative action on behalf of Remillard-Dandini and its
wholly owned subsidiary San-Jose Brick Tile, Ltd. ("the manufacturing com-
panies"). The suit sought to recover profits and declare void a contract between
the manufacturing companies and Remillard-Dandini Sales Corporation ("the
sales corporation"). The sales corporation was organized and wholly owned by
defendants Stanley and Sturgis, who through proxies and contracts also con-
trolled the manufacturing companies.
Initially, Stanley and Sturgis offered to purchase the shares in Remillard
approval by the disinterested directors yet, still inquired as to fairness. Under Scott the
Remillard court would not have had to go further after that finding of no board approval.
Thus Scott's reliance on Remillard is unfounded. In addition, there is no support for the Scott
approach in the legislative history of the California model or in the New Jersey Commentary.
44 The requirement of fairness has been viewed as a protection for shareholders. See text
accompanying notes 163-199 infra, for a discussion of fairness.
45 Note that the California model requires minimum disclosure of interest by the director
and not additionally the facts and 'circumstances as to the transaction. But see Armstrong
Manors v. Burris, 193 Cal. App. 447, 14 Cal. Rptr. 338, 343 (1961). The following states
follow the California model of requiring only minimal disclosure of interest: Arizona; Con-
necticut; Florida; Indiana; Kentucky; Maryland; Nevada; New Jersey; New York; North
Carolina; Virginia; West Virginia; Wisconsin. See note 81 infra for those states which require
full disclosure.
46 See note 8 supra.
47 Note, The Status of The Fairness Test Under Section 713 of The New York Business
Corporation Law, 76 COL. L. Rav. 1156, 1185; Note, Interested Director's Contracts-Section
713 of The New York Business Corporation Law and The Fairness Test, 41 Foma. L. Rav. 639
(1973) [hereinafter cited as FORDEAm NOTE]. Kessler, The New York Business Corporation
Law, 36 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 1, 75-76, n.304 (1961). Comment, The Voidability of Inter-
ested Director Contracts Under the Kansas Corporation Code, 24 KAN. L. Rxv. 655, 673(1976) [hereinafter cited as KANSAS NOTE]. Hoffman, The Status of Shareholders and
Directors under Business Corporation Law: A Comparative View, 11 BUFF. L. REv. 496, 566-
67 (1961-62); HORNSTESN, infra note 65 (1968 pocket part at 210); LATTIN, supra note 9,
at 293.
48 E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 75 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
FOLK]. Comment, Corporations supra note 29, at 485-86; Note, The Fairness Test of Corporate
Contracts with Interested Directors, 61 HARv. L. REv. 335, 339 (1948) [hereinafter cited as
HARVARD NOTE]. Cf. Note, The Unfair Interested Directors Contract under New York Business
Corporation Law, 16 BuFF. L. Rav. 841 (1967).
49 109 Cal. App. 2d, 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952).
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Brick Co. owned by Lillian Dandini. When she refused, they decided to separate
the sales function from the manufacturing companies by setting up the sales
corporation. A contract which transferred the sales function away from the
manufacturing companies was entered into between the manufacturing com-
panies and the sales corporation. Although a majority of the disinterested
directors of the manufacturing companies did not approve the contract, the
majority shareholders (i.e. Stanley and Sturgis) consented to the transaction.
Defendants argued that since there was disclosure and shareholder approval, the
statutory requirement had been satisfied and thus the contract was valid.
The Supreme Court of California rejected the defendant's contentions and
voided the contract. The court held that "[e]ven though the requirements of
Section 820 of the California Model are technically met, transactions that are
unfair and unreasonable to the corporation may be avoided." 5 The court ap-
pears to have reached this conclusion by relying on the good faith requirement
for all directors found in the first paragraph of the statute.-"
The court could have reached the same result of voiding the contract with-
out making fairness a mandatory requirement under the statute. It could have
found that the defendants were not in technical compliance with the statute
because the facts justified a finding that the directors acted in bad faith. The
court described the defendant's action in such terms as "mulct; harsh and un-
fair"; and to "strip" a corporation of its assets. 2 These findings could easily have
led to a conclusion of bad faith. There were also express findings by the trier of
fact 5 of fraud and breach of the fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders by
the controlling majority. 4 Despite these express findings, the Remillard court
did not limit its decisions to situations where there is a showing of bad faith, fraud
or breach of fiduciary duty. The important thing to note is that the court held
that unfair transactions are voidable notwithstanding compliance with the share-
holder approval requirement of the statute.5
50 Id. at 74.
51 Id. at 73. This seems to equate good faith with fairness. See Note, Corporate Fiduciary
Doctrine in the Context of Parents Subsidiary Relations, 74 YALE L. J. 338, 342 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as YALE NOTE]. Contra FOLK, supra note 48, at 88. Most cases which speak
of good faith and fairness always refer to them separately, implying that they are not equitable.
See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 296, 306 (1939); Mueller v. Macban, 62 Cal. App. 3d
258, 132 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976). Yet in Pepper, the Supreme Court in articulating a test -
i.e., an arm's length bargain-doesn't indicate whether the test is for fairness, good faith or
both. See quotation from Pepper in text accompanying note 169 infra. In the context of the
statute equating good faith and the statutory requirement of fairness would appear to be con-
trary to the rules of statutory construction. See CORPORATIONS supra note 29, at
485. However, it would not be contrary to statutory construction if the requirement of fairness
in the statute were procedural fairness. See discussion of procedural fairness in text accompany-
ing notes 64-69 infra.
52 See note 42 supra at 73-74.
53 Id. at 71.
54 Id. at 73. Controlling shareholders have been viewed as fiduciaries with respect to other
shareholders. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 296 (1939).
55 Accord KENNERSON, supra note 37. See also Schoff v. Clough, 380 P.2d 464, 465
(Nev. 1963). One commentator indicates that Noe v. Rousell, 310 So. 2d 806 (La. 1975),
suggests that the Remillard approach is adopted in Louisiana under their statute. Note,
Corporations, Fiduciaries and Conflicts of Interests. 36 LA. L. Rav. 320, 325 (1975). A close
examination of the case reveals that this contention is without substance. The court deals with
the issue of burden of proof placing it upon the fiduciary (the liquidator) to show that the
transaction was an arm's length affair without discussing the effect of the statute. There was
no discussion of whether there was board or shareholder approval pursuant to the statute 310
So. 2d at 818-19.
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In other words, the Remillard approach would allow interested directors'
transactions to be voided if they were found to be unfair even though the specific
requirements of the statute-disclosure to and approval of disinterested share-
holders-had been complied with. Such a radical departure from the apparently
obvious wording of the statute can only be justified in light of the legislative
history of the California statute in conjunction with the common law develop-
ment to that point. According to Henry Ballantine, a drafter of the statute, its
purpose was an attempt to relax "the strictness of the California decisions to the
effect that the interested directors' vote may not be counted toward a majority and
that his presence may not be considered in determining whether a quorum of
directors is present." 6 The drafters of the statute did not intend to affect the
voidability of transactions which were unfair, 7 but to overcome the problems
created by the "involvement" of interested directors in the approval or ratifica-
tion process." Thus the statute, by dealing only with the director's involvement,
was aimed at curing procedural problems, not at assuring substantive fairness. If
it were to be read as somehow limiting a court's ability to inquire into sub-
stantive fairness, it would dearly run contrary to developing common law on
point which emphasized a concern for substantive fairness. The drafters wanted
merely to clear up a procedural point and not to change the entire course of the
common law dealing with fairness.59
On the other hand, it might be argued that if fairness is viewed as an over-
riding requirement, then the statutory provision of fairness as an alternative to
board or shareholder approval would be mere "surplusage," and thus contrary to
traditional principles of statutory interpretation. This conclusion need not
necessarily follow, however, if one views the statutory fairness requirement as
being operative as a savings clause for certain procedural defects, i.e., as a concern
56 BALLANTINE, Questions of Policy, supra note 26, at 475. Note that the statutory language
itself indicates the contract is neither "void nor voidable because" of the voting, or presence of
the director thus leaving nonprocedural grounds for attacking a transaction.
57 According to Ballantine,
It was the view of the majority of the committee on corporations, however, that
transactions with a director or between corporations with common directors should be
merely voidable for unfairness and not void or voidable at the option of the corpora-
tion by reason of the fact that such director participated in a quorum or a majority.
Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
But see changes in the California Corporation Law effective August 14, 1931 and analysis by
legislative counsel bureau of assembly bill no. 1000 (Ch. 862) at 116 which indicates that the
section was a means by which directors may avoid violating their fiduciary duty. The Analysis
stated that any transaction with interested directors "is valid under the following circumstances
even though the interested director is present and voting . . . [the circumstances are essentially
subsections a through c of § 820]" (emphisis added). While this analysis may indicate that
the statute is a validating provision, this validation may be limited by the previous quote which
indicated that the validity may apply only to the problems under the common law of presence
and voting by the director, leaving the question of fairness open.
58 Id. at 475. See BALLANTINE & STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW (1949).
Under the common law, a transaction would still have been voidable even though the interested
director was not necessary for the vote or absented himself to avoid a conflict of interest. See
Note, LEGAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 15, at 60.
59 See, e.g., Shlensky v. South Parkway Building Corp. 19 Ill.2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 739
(1960). See text accompanying notes 19-28 supra, for a discussion of the common law.
60 Cf. Comment, Corporations, supra note 29, at 485 indicates:
May authorization or ratification in good faith be equated to a just and reason-
able contract? Such a view would violate a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation
by making subdivisions (a) and (b) largely surplusage.
MARSH, supra note 9, at 47.
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for procedural fairness.6 This concern .with procedural fairness is consistent with
the common law which looked at the presence or vote of the interested director62
(procedural considerations) in addition to fairness.6"
The fact that the statutory requirement of fairness focuses at the time of the
authorization or approval of the transaction 4 further supports the view that the
statutes are concerned with procedural not substantive fairness. Both the com-
mon law prior to the adoption of the statutes" and cases decided under the
statutes66 have viewed the substantive fairness of the transaction at dates sub-
sequent to the approval-a view which is contrary to the statute.
This procedural savings clause of the statute may operate in those cases
where there is a failure to comply with either board or shareholder approval as
required by the statute. A court could review the board or shareholder approval
process or lack thereof to determine if the failure to comply with the statute
would affect procedural fairness. For example, a technical non-compliance with
the California model such as a failure to note disclosures of "interest" in the
corporate minutes, should not necessarily render a contract void. The savings
clause could save the transaction as still being procedurally fair. Similarly, in the
context of a closed corporation, all the facts may be known by all the directors
and shareholders but there may be no formal approval pursuant to the statute.
The transaction should still be valid because it was procedurally fair, given the
full disclosure 7 and the usual informal manner in which close corporations are
run.
68
Thus, fairness under the statute, if viewed in a procedural context, leaves
the question of substantive fairness open for judicial inquiry and is not pre-
cluded by the disjunctive approach of the statutes.6 9
61 Cf. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir., 1965)
which involved the concept of "unconscionability" under § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (1962). The court in applying the concept looked at both procedural considerations(e.g., the manner in which the agreement was entered into) and substantive considerations (e.g.,
th2 terms of contract). See Leff, Unconscionability And The Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967).
62 See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra, for a discussion of the common law view.
63 Cf. Harvard Note note 47 supra, at 340. The Note suggests that fairness involves ques-
tions about the contract itself and the process of approval:
In practice we have found that a court will look first to the terms of the contract,
but this inquiry usually throws insufficient light on the question of whether acceptance
of the contract was an exercise of business judgment. An examination of the conduct
of the directors - as a coordinate line of inquiry - yields more illuminating data.
64 CAL. CiV. CODE § 820(c). Some statutes add the term "ratification." See, e.g., Delaware
infra note 78.
65 Roger v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933). Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas and Electric Co.,
224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 379, 380-81 (1918).
66 See Remillard, supra note 42, at 76; Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 n.2 (Del.
1976). Neither case makes reference to the statutes in making its determination of fairness
at a date which conflicts with the statute.
67 The use of procedural fairness to save transactions which do not comply with the
requirements of board or shareholder approval would normally mandate full disclosure of both
the interest and the terms of the transaction. Cf. 2 HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND
PRACTIcE 439 (1959) [hereinafter cited as HORNSTEIN].
68 Armstrong Manors v. Burris, 193 Cal. App. 2d 447, 14 Cal. Rptr. 338, 343 (1961)
Brainard v. De La Montanya, 116 P.2d 66, 70 (1941).
69 If the statutory requirement of fairness is procedural in nature, then it could invalidate
an otherwise fair transaction. For example, a corporation has ten directors of which six enter
into a contract with the corporation. If the contract is substantively fair but all the dis-
interested directors vote against it, then the contract could be voided. This results from the
failure to meet any of the statutory requirements. There has been no board or stockholder
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The Remillard approach may also be justified if the statutes are viewed as
only determinative of who has the burden of proof."0 Under the common law,
the burden of proving the fairness of a transaction was usually on the interested
director. 1 Thus compliance with board of shareholder approval under the
statute arguably would either lessen that burden" or shift it to those challenging
the transaction." Failure to comply with board or shareholder approval would,
on the other hand, bring into play the fairness requirement of the statute. This
requirement would then place the burden of persuasion on the interested director
to prove substantive fairness. Although this approach is consistent with the dis-
junctive nature of the statute because substantive fairness remains an issue, a
shifting of burden of persuasion to those challenging the transaction may create
an insurmountable obstacle, thus precluding fairness. This would be contrary to
the Remillard approach. To avoid this result, compliance with statute should
only have the effect of removing the presumption of unfairness and only shift
the burden of going forward to the plaintiffs.7 4
approval pursuant to the statute. This result is consistent with the policy of requiring corpo-
rate interests in cases of self-dealing to be the concern of those disinterested directors.
70 Israels, supra note 43, at 627. There is no legislative history or intent by the drafts-
men indicating that the California model was designed to deal with burden of proof. Chase
v. Super-Cold Corporation, 328 P.2d 812, 814 (Cal. 1958). But see Tevis v. Beigel, 344 P.2d
360, 363 (Cal. 1959). There is no statutory language indicating that the statutes were designed
for that purpose. In fact, some states have specifically included language which indicates that
the burden shifts upon compliance with the statute. See, e.g., Virginia and the new California
statute. See part C of text, infra.
71 FORDHAM NOTE, supra note 47, at 664. See, e.g., Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining
Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921).
72 In Scott, supra note 36, the court held that the burden does not shift to those challeng-
ing the transaction under New Jersey's adaptation of the California Model. The court states
that compliance with the statute "sets a less stringent standard for the requisite proof, substitut-
ing the preponderance of evidence test for the clear and convincing requirement." Id. at 68.
The court relies on the Commissioners' Note accompanying N.J. STATS. ANN. 14A: 6-8 which
indicates that the statute was designed to change the rule of Abeles v. Adams Engineering Co.,
Inc., 33 N.J. 411, 173 A. 2d 246 (1961), which places the burden on the interested director
to demonstrate by "clear and convincing proof" that the transaction is fair (emphasis supplied).
The court reached that conclusion because the Commissioner's Note indicated that general
equitable principles still apply to test the validity of transactions. The court also held that all
three requirements of th'. statute (board approval, shareholder approval and the showing of
fairness) must be met before the less stringent standard of proof would apply. Id. at 67. See
text accompanying note 43 supra. To suggest that all three statutory requirements must be met
to lower the standard appears absurd. This would require an interested director to first prove
the transaction fair under the statute in order for him to then prove fairness under a less
stringent test. But one way to rationalize this incongruity would be to view the statutory fair-
ness requirement as procedural, thus a director showing board approval: shareholder approval
and procedural fairness have a less stringent test to prove substantive fairness. See text accom-
panying notes 61-69 supra, for a discussion of procedural fairness.
73 See Israsls, supra note 43. Cf. Tevis v. Beigel, 156 Cal. App. 2d 319 P.2d 98,
102-103 (1957). Some case law indicated that a charter or by-law nrov-s'on allowing
such transactions would at least "exonerate them from adverse inferences which might otherwise
be drawn against them." Spiegel v. Beacon Participations 8 N.E. 2d 895, 907 (1937); see also
Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227. This is not shifting of the burden of persuasion, but only a
removal of the inference unfairness, thus requiring plaintiffs to bear the initial burden of going
forward.
74 Ward, Some Notes on Transactors Involving Interested and Interlockina Directors in
Pennsylvania, 23 TEMP. L. Q. 107 1949. Under the common law some courts held the burden
of persuasion was on the directors to prove fairness, i.e., that the transaction was presumptively
unfair. Other courts required those challenging the transaction to at least allege some facts
or circumstances besides interest, which could appear to be unfair. That is, a burden of going
forward was on the plaintiff. The burden of persuasion would still be on the interested direc-
tors to convince the court that the transaction was fair. Id. at 113. This view should be the
effect of the statute since it is consistent with case law seemingly indicating that only the pre-
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The California approach as reflected by Remillard with fairness as an
overriding requirement, therefore, may be rationalized by the drafters' view as
reflected by Ballantine; or by viewing the statutory requirement of fairness as a
procedural savings clause; or by classifying the statutes as dealing with burden
of going forward; or on a policy that fairness is necessary to protect share-
holders.7"
B. The Delaware Approach
Professor Ernest Folk maintains that the Remillard approach is inapplicable
in Delaware because California has "a very different statute and a judicial point
of view at variance with Delaware . . .,, He argues that the purpose and effect
of the Delaware provision "is to validate a contract between a corporation and
one or more of its directors or officers, or between a corporation and other entities
which are linked by common directors or officers, if any one of statutory tests is
met" (emphasis added).
Section 144 of the Delaware Corporation Law 8 does differ from the
sumption of unfairness can be removed. See SPIEGEL, supra note 73. If the statute goes further
and, upon compliance, places the burden of persuasion upon those challenging the transaction,
it would often mean that this procedural rule would place an insurmountable burden on the
plaintiffs. In actuality this could keep a court from scrutinizing a transaction and thus in
effect eliminate fairness which is contrary to the Remillard approach.
75 This policy of protecting shareholders appears to be the principal argument of the
commentators in note 47 supra for requiring fairness. See text accompanying notes 61-69 supra
for a discussion of fairness.
76 FOLK, supra note 48, at 88 n.70. Delaware has been criticized as being overly protective
of the interests of management or majority shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders.
See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law-Reflection Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974); NADER, GREEN & SELIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE
FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS (1976). California has been a lead-
ing exponent of the protection of minority shareholders. See, e.g., Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson &
Co., 81 Cal. Rutr. 592, 460 F.2d 464 (1969). But see Singer v. Magnavox, note 33 supra.
77 Id. at 75. Cf. Tennessee Dressed Beef Co. v. Hall, 519 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tenn. 1975),
criticized in Recent Developments, Corporations Duty a Loyalty and Corporate Opportunity -
Transactions Between Corporations with Common Directors, 43 TENN. L. REV. 155 (1975).
But see The Comment to the Model Act § 41 (which follows the California model and does
not require full disclosure of the transaction) at 842 which initially indicates that "Its purpose
is to establish statutory guidelines for determining the validity of transactions. . . . It validates,
if the prescribed tests are satisfied, transactions with interested directors which common law
rules often make voidable, if not void" (emphasis added). However, it later states that "The
function of section 41 is not to provide a basis for validating for all purposes a contract or
transaction ...but simply to establish that such contract or transaction is not automatically
void or voidable solely by reason of the director's interest." Id. at 844. This inconsistency
arises because of the tension between the disjunctive nature of the statute which suggests valid-
ity and the courts' and commentators' senses of equity and the requirements of fiduciary duty
which mandates fairness.
78 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (1975) reads:(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of its
directors or officers, or between a corporation and any other corporation, partner-
ship, association, or other organization in which 1 or more of its directors or officers,
or have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely for this reason, or solely
because the director or officer is present at or participates in the meeting of the board
or committee which authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because his or
their votes are counted for such purpose, if;
(1) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract
or transaction are disclosed or are known to the board of directors or the committee,
and the board or committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by
the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors, even though the dis-
interested directors be less than a quorum; or
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California statute."9 The Delaware statute, unlike its California counterpart, has
no general requirement of good faith for directors"0 although, like California,
good faith is specifically required for board or shareholder approval."' Signifi-
cantly, the disclosure requirement in California is limited to disclosure of the
adverse interest,"' while Delaware requires disclosure of "material facts as to his
relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction .. (emphasis
added). In essence, Delaware requires full disclosure.
If Folk's view is correct and it is a validating statute, then this requirement
of full disclosure removes the question of fairness from judicial inquiry when the
board or shareholders approve a transaction pursuant to the statute.8' The
question of the propriety of the transaction is then left to the board or share-
holders, not the courts.8 5 This view substitutes full disclosure for fairness.8 '
Is the Folk view justifiable? There appears to be no legislative history" to
(2) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or
transaction are disclosed or are known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon,
and the contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the
shareholders; or
(3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it
is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the
shareholders.(b) Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence
of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or of a committte which authorizes
the contract or transaction.
79 The Delaware statute unlike California specifically provides for board approval with "a
majority of the disinterested directors even though the disinterested directors are less than a
quorum." See note 37 supra, for a discussion of California requirements. This provision
clearly does not require a majority of all the directors present. But the statute is unclear
whether one needs a disinterested majority of the whole quorum or a majority of disinter-
ested directors present. Contra ARSHT note 35 supra. Thus in the example in note 37 supra,
the quorum was seven directors. Under the former approach the four disinterested directors
are required, while under the latter, only three of the five disinterested are required.
80 See A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 34 (1976). This distinction from
California should not be significant. Although the statute doesn't require good faith, Delaware
case law views directors as fiduciaries operating within the business judgment rule which pre-
sumes good faith. Delaware Bar Association, Resource Document on Delaware Corporation
Law 19 (1976) [hereinafter cited as RESOURCE DOCUMENT].
81 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144(a)(1), (2) (1975). The following states also require
good faith approval by the shareholder: Georgia, Kansas, California, Louisiana, Nevada, New
York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.
82 But see Angelos Securities Corporation v. Ball, 20 Cal. App. 2d 436, 67 P.2d 158, 160
(1937).
83 The following states require full disclosure of both the interest and the facts as to the
transaction: Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee. See note 44 supra, for those states requiring only minimal
disclosure of interest.
84 Fo.K, supra note 48, at 82-86. But see Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. Sup.
1976), and text accompanying notes 102-05 infra.
85 Courts are reluctant to inquire into the decision-making of directors, or shareholders
when the business judgment rule or shareholder ratification applies. Gottlieb v. Heyden
Chemical Corp., 91 A.2d 57 (Del. 1952); Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 737 (Del. 1960).
86 See text accompanying notes 114-22 infra. See generally Cary, Corporate Standards and
Legal Rules, 50 CAL. L. REv. 408 (1962). According to Cary, full disclosure may have a
prophylactic effect on controlling shareholders or directors in the context of publicly held com-
panies. But full disclosure does not necessarily restrain the activity of such shareholders or
directors in the context of smaller corporations, without public shareholders. It would not be
surprising for a controlling shareholder to inform the minority of proposed oppression. Cf.
Remillad, supra note 42. at 74.
87 There appears to be a general reluctance in Delaware to provide information on the
deliberations of the 1967 revision of the Delaware Corporation Law for a variety of reasons.
See Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA.
L. Rzv. 861, 863-70 (1969).
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clarify the apparent statutory effect which validates contracts upon board or
shareholder approval.88 Prior Delaware case law arguably supports Folk's view.
Under Folk's view, the requirement of board approval under the statute
appears to be an extension of the business judgment rule.89 Delaware courts,
prior to the enactment of the statute, did not inquire into the question of fairness
whenever the business judgment rule was found to apply. That rule was used
to uphold transactions whenever a disinterested majority of the board approved
it.90 The Delaware Supreme Court in articulating the rationale for this rule,
indicated that, "At most, therefore, we find ourselves in the twilight zone where
reasonable businessmen, fully informed might differ. We think, therefore, we are
precluded from substituting our uninformed opinion for that of experienced
business managers of a corporation who have no personal interest in the out-
come . . ."" (emphasis added) The rule was inapplicable, however, whenever
a majority of the board was interested.92 According to Folk, the statutory re-
quirement of board approval extends the application of the business judgment
rule to situations where a majority of the board is interested. This results from
the statutory language9" which allows approval of a majority of disinterested
directors even though they constitute less than a quorum.9 4 Under this rule then,
upon board approval pursuant to the statute, the only way to attack the transac-
tion would be to prove that the business judgment rule should not apply.99
Since the requirements of the Delaware statute under Folk's view are in the
alternative, good faith shareholder ratification with full disclosure would also
preclude questions of fairness.9" With such a ratification, a disinterested share-
holder could only attack the transaction if he could show "the terms are so un-
equal as to amount to waste."9 But Folk argues that the statute does not require
88 It is interesting to note that the RESOURCE DOCUMENT, supra note 80, prepared by the
Delaware Bar Association in response to critics of Delaware corporate law ignores Section 144
and Folk's analysis of that section. The Document indicates that a director as a fiduciary
should not profit from his position and further that, "[when challenged, he must prove, that
transactions in which he has interest are fair." Id. at 22.
89 FOLK, supra note 48, at 82-83.
90 BEARD, supra note 85, at 737-38.
91 Id. at 738-39.
92 GOTTLIEB, supra note 85. Approval by disinterested shareholders may insulate a trans-
action approved by the interested board from an inquiry of fairness. The court states: "[T]he
entire atmosphere is freshened and a new set of rules invoked where formal approval has been
given by a majority of independent, fully informed (share)holders." Id. at 59.
93 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § S144 (a) (1). FOLK, supra note 48, at 83. See note 79 supra,
for a discussion of the language.
94 Under Folk's analysis, the statute changes Gottlieb, supra note 83. In that case a nine-
member board, of which six directors were interested, approved of an option plan unanimously.
In Gottlieb, the court still looked to fairness because there wasn't a disinterested quorum.
Under the statute, since all three disinterested directors approved the transaction, fairness would
not be an issue.
95 FOLK indicates that the business judgment rule does not apply to findings of:
Fraud, actual or constructive, such as improper motive or personal gain or arbitrary
action or conscious disregard of the interests of the corporation and the right of
stockholders or "fraud or gross abuse of discretion" or "bad faith in the transaction"
or if the transaction is "so manifestly unfair or to indicate fraud" or there "is a
showing of gross and palpable overreaching."
See note 48, supra at 76.
96 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (a) (2); id. at 85-86. Cf. GOTTLIEB, supra note 85, at 59.
97 GOTTLIEB at 58. The transaction may be attacked if shown "that no reasonable business-
man, fully informed as to the respective value and acting in good faith, could be expected to
consider the bargain attractive to the corporation." Id. at 59.
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the ratification of disinterested shareholders." Under his view, a transaction
ratified by interested shareholders could not be attacked for unfairness.99 While
the statute does not refer to interest when discussing shareholder approval,0 0
nonetheless, a requirement that only disinterested shareholders may vote can be
implied by the statute's requirement of good faith approval.' Otherwise, Folk's
view is a significant departure from fiduciary duties under existing Delaware
case law and such a departure would require a clear expression of legislative
intent to do so.
A recent decision in Delaware indicates a view contrary to Folk's. In
Fliegler v. Lawrence,..2 the Supreme Court of Delaware dealt with a Section 144
transaction where Agau Mines, Inc., ("Agau") a Delaware Corporation, had
been granted an option to acquire another corporation whose stock was controlled
by some of Agau's directors and shareholders. In return for the option, Agau
transferred 800,000 shares of its stock to that corporation. The transaction was
approved by the board of directors and the shareholders. Those attempting to
uphold the transaction argued Folk's view that there was a validation of the trans-
action because of compliance with the statutory requirement of shareholder ap-
proval, even though there was no disinterested majority. The court rejected
this contention and determined that fairness was still an issue notwithstanding
the shareholder approval. The court stated:
We do not read the statute as providing the broad immunity for which de-
fendants contend. It merely removes "interested director" cloud when its
terms are met and provides against invalidation of an agreement "solely"
because such a director or officer is involved. Nothing in the statute sanc-
tions unfairness to Agau or removes the transaction from judicial scrutiny.'03
This view indicates that compliance with the statute does not necessarily validate
transactions, but, like the California model and the Remillard approach, it leaves
the question of fairness open. While the decision may be restricted to situations
where there is approval by interested shareholders,0 " the emphasis on the term
98 FOLK, supra note 88. Contra Fliegler, supra note 84. Tennessee and North Carolina
exclude all interested shareholders from voting while Maine and the new California statute
exclude interested directors from voting their shares. Nevada specifically allows interested
shareholders to vote.
99 Id. at 84-85.
100 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 144 (a) (2).
101 See KANSAs NomE, supra note 47, at 666. But see FOLK, supra note 48, at 86. In
BEARD, supra note 85, at 737, the court indicates that ratification even by disinterested share-
holders may "not supply the necessary element of good faith exercise of business judgment by
Directors." Arguably, approval by only interested shareholders could not be in good faith. See
note 79 supra, for a listing of those states which also require good faith approval. In those
states which do not have a provision for good faith approval, a requirement of disinterest
would depend upon the common law rule in that state. BLACK, supra note 31, at 360. If there
is no such requirement of disinterested shareholders' approval and the statute is deemed to
validate transactions, then in the case of an unfair transaction, one would have to argue under
the limitations of shareholder ratification. See text accompanying notes 129-33 infra.
102 361 A.2d 218.
103 Id. at 222.
104 The court did not address itself to § 144 (a) (1) and whether or not board approval
pursuant to the statute would preclude a review for fairness. The reason for not considering
the issue was that the only disinterested director did not participate at the meeting in which
the Board exercised the option. Id. at 222 n.3.
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"solely" by the court could be a basis for arguing that fairness is also an issue
where there is approval by the board of directors under the statute. Since
"solely" appears in the introductory clause and was found applicable to the
alternative of shareholder approval, it should likewise apply to the alternative of
board approval." 5
Even if Fliegler is restricted, or if the Folk view is adopted,0 0 those transac-
tions could still be attacked on other grounds. First, one could argue that full
disclosure was not made. Second, one could argue that approval was not made
in good faith either by the board or the shareholders. Third, the transactions
do not fall within the business judgment rule or the shareholder ratification rule.
Any of these grounds of attack may in substance be an indirect method of
arguing fairness and thus be a means of retaining the fairness test.'
Some courts have taken the position that full disclosure may be a factor in
determining fairness,0 8 and one court has found that the failure to disclose is in
itself unfair.' Full disclosure, however, has never been equated with substantive
fairness."0 Yet, under the Folk analysis, it appears that full disclosure has re-
placed fairness. This may not be significant because in self-dealing situations,
there will rarely be full disclosure."' If a court concludes that the requirement
of full disclosure has not been met,"' then the fairness requirement of the statute
would come into play."'
The good faith requirement of the Delaware statute is directed at both
board and shareholder approval."' It is arguable that good faith is the equiv-
alent of fairness under the statute." 5 While "good faith" can be viewed both sub-
jectively and objectively,"0 it normally requires use of a subjective test."' Yet
the statutory language focuses on good faith board or shareholder approval, not
on the individual good faith of the directors or shareholders, thus implying an
105 See SUTHERLAND, supra note 31, at § 4605, 56-57.
106 An adaptation of the Folk view appears to be adopted in the new California statute in
the context of mere interlocking boards. See Part C infra.
107 See Part D infra, for a discussion of fairness.
108 Voss Oil Company v. Voss, 367 P.2d 977, 979 (1962).
109 State ex rel. Hays Oyster v. Keypoint System Co., 64 Wash.2d 375, 391 P.2d 979 (1964).
See HORNSTEIN, supra note 67.
110 Note, Corporation-Directors-Transactions Involving Conflicts of Interest, 42 ORE. L.
REV. 61, 65 (1962).
111 Cf. Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719 (2d Cir. 1972)
In many if not most corporate self-dealing transactions touching securities, state
law does not demand prior shareholder approval. In these situations it makes sense
to concentrate on the impropriety of the conduct itself rather than on the "failure to
disclose" it because full and fair disclosure will rarely occur.
But in the closed corporation context you may find full disclosure and knowledge by all share-
holders of everything going on even when there is self-deaing and thus full disclosure would
not protect the minority's interest. Remillard, supra note 42, at 74.
112 It would be necessary for those seeking the protection of the statute to initially convince
the court that the statute's requirements are met. Cf. Tevis, supra note 70, at 363.
113 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (a) (3).
114 Id. at § 144 (a) (1) & (2).
115 REMILLARD, supra note 42, at 73. See note 49 supra.
116 KANSAS NOTE, supra note 47, at 665-66.
117 Id. In either case, the standard of what amounts to good faith may vary in different
contexts. For instance, behavior that may be permissible in a large corporation may not be
tolerated in a closed corporation. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. and New 'England,
328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
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objective standard." 8 Whether or not an objective or subjective test is used may
not be significant because a court should in either case look to the facts and
circumstances from which an inference of good faith or lack thereof could be
drawn." 9 In so doing, a court must necessarily look to the substance of the
transaction, which in essence would be an inquiry into fairness.2
Good faith would also be available to attack a transaction when a director
or shareholder improperly influences or dominates other directors or share-
holders.' Good faith may also allow a direct action against those interested and
disinterested directors who approve an unfair transaction.'22
The business judgment rule precludes judicial inquiry into decision making
by a board because directors are presumed to be acting in best interest of the
corporation.'' Traditionally this rule was inapplicable whenever self-dealing
was involved, 4 and when there was a majority of interested directors on the
board.'25 As previously discussed, Folk argues that the statute has extended the
business judgment rule to self-dealing situations even when the disinterested
directors who approve the transaction are less than a quorum."2 If this rule is
demonstrated to be applicable, it is incumbent upon those challenging the trans-
action to show actual or constructive fraud, bad faith, manifest unfairness, or
gross or palpable overreaching. 7 While these limitations on the business judg-
ment rule do not appear to approach a fairness standard, one may argue that an
unfair transaction amounts to fraud because of the breach of fiduciary duty. As
one court indicated:
Fraud, indeed, in the sense of a court of equity properly includes all acts,
omissions and concealments, which involve a breach of legal or equitable
duty, trust, or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another or by
which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another .... 128
118 It is impossible to infer a subjective state of mind from group activity like action by the
board or shareholders as a whole.
119 Although a subjective test focusses on the state of mind of the person involved, it, like
any fact, involves an inquiry into circumstances. In Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 249 Cal. App. 2d
187, 57 Cal. Rptr. 248, 251-52 (1967), the court in analyzing good faith in the context of an
interested director's transaction indicated good faith is "used to describe that state of mind
denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and generally speaking, means
being faithful to one's duty or obligation." That is, a subjective test is employed. In their
analysis of good faith, the court examined the transaction and found: "Upon substantial
evidence that the contract entered into was, because of the terms of payment, not just and
reasonable, that is, that it was unfair to the corporation, it follows that the contract was in that
sense and that sense only not entered into in good faith."
120 The KANSAs NOTE suggests that an objective test should be used when a transaction is
fair and a subjective test when it is unfair. See note 47, supra at 665.
121 Id.; cf. Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas and Electric Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 379
(1918).
122 C. Recent Developments, supra note 77, at 160. The business judgment rule which
may protect the directors would only operate if it can be shown that informed directors exer-
cised due care by directing "some thought and attention to the transaction they are asked to
approve." FOLK, supra note 48, at 81.
123 Beard, supra note 85, at 738-39. FOLK, supra note 48, at 75. Arsht & Stapleton,
Delaware New Corporation Law: Substantive Changes, 23 Bus. LAw 75, 81-82 (1967).
124 Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
125 FOLK, supra note 48, at 83.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 76.
128 Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court in
reversing indicates that the Second Circuit's definition of fraud was inapplicable to SEC Rule
10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 because of the specific requirement of
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Compliance with shareholder ratification under the statute, according to
Folk, validates the transaction even if the shares of the interested directors are
needed for approval.1 29 If that ratification rule applies, those challenging the
transaction may have to show that the transaction amounts to waste,'3 0 fraud
or oppression,"' or even that the transaction is not "the product of honest busi-
ness judgment."' 13 2 These limitations to shareholder ratification are like those of
the business judgment rule and arguably may also equate with a fairness
standard."3
C. New California Section 310
In 1975, California enacted a new Corporations Code which was effective
on January 1, 1977. Section 310"' deals with interested directors' transactions
scienter compelled by the Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). In
the context of self-dealint and breach of fiduciary duty the Second Circuit's definition should
apply, because it would be unreasonable to require a shareholder to show actual intent. See
text accompanying notes 177-84 infra, for a discussion of fraud as a test of fairness.
129 FOLK, supra note 48, at 83. Full disclosure must occur and there must be specific
approval in good faith by the stockholder.
130 Id. at 84. If there is unanimous agreement the shareholders should be able to do as
they please. Id.
131 Sneed, The Stockholder May Vote as He Pleases; Theory and Fact, 22 U. PITT. L.
REV. 23, 39 (1960).
132 Arsht, supra note 123, at 82.
133 See text accompanying notes 123-28 supra. Since those shareholders who control a
corporation have been found to be fiduciary to the minority shareholders, a vote involving their
self-interest may involve a breach of duty which could come within the broad definition of fraud
articulated in the text at note 128 supra. Sneed, supra note 131, argues that in those cases in
which the interested directors' transactions are unfair, courts have found the transaction to be
fraudulent and thus not subject to ratification.
134 CAL. CORP. CODa § 310 (West Supp. 1976) reads as follows:
CONTRACTS IN WHICH DIRECTOR HAS MATERIAL FINANCIAL INTER-
ESTS VALIDITY
(a) No contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or more of its
directors, or between a corporation and any corporation, firm or association in which
one or more of its directors has a material financial interest, is either void or void-
able because such director or directors or such other corporation, firm or association
are parties or because such director or directors are present at the meeting of the
board or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or ratifies the contract or
transaction, if
(1) The material facts as to the transaction and as to such director's interest are
fully disclosed or known to the shareholders and such contract or transaction is
approved by the shareholders (Section 153) in good faith, with the shares owned
by the interested director or directors not being entitled to vote thereon, or
(2) The material facts as to the transaction and as to such director's interest are
fully disclosed or known to the board or committee, and the board or committee
authorizes, approves or ratifies the contract or transaction in good faith by a vote
sufficient without counting the vote of the interested director or directors and
the contract or transaction is just and reasonable as to the corporation at the
time it is authorized, approved or ratified, or
(3) As to the contracts or transactions not approved as provided in paragraph
(1) or (2) of th;s subdivision, the person asserting the validity of the contract or
transaction sustains the burden of proving that the contract or transaction wasjust and reasonable as to the corporation at the time it was authorized, approved
or ratified.
A mere common directorship does not constitute a material financial interest within
the meaning of this subdivision. A director is not interested within the meaning of
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and its language appears to be much clearer than the California model on the
role of fairness. The statute has two different rules. One rule applies to cases in
which a director contracts with his corporation directly or to cases where the
contract is between two corporations in which the director has material financial
interest. 3 ' The other rule applies to transactions between corporations with
interlocking directors where the directors have no financial interest in either
corporation i.e., the outside director.
Under the first rule, if the transaction and interest 30 are fully disclosed or
known to the shareholders and approved by them in good faith without counting
the shares owned by the interested directors, then the transaction appears to be
valid.'37 If the material facts as to both the transaction and interest are fully
disclosed or known to the board which approves the transaction in good faith
without counting the votes of the interested director and the transaction is "just
and reasonable as to the corporation" at the point of board action, then the
this subdivision in a resolution fixing the compensation of another director as a
director, officer or employee of the corporation, notwithstanding the fact that the
first director is also receiving compensation from the corporation.
(b) No contract or other transaction between a corporation and any corporation
or association of which one or more of its directors are directors is either void cr
voidable because such director or directors are present at the meeting of the board
or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or ratifies the contract or trans-
action, if
(1) The material facts as to the transaction and as to such director's other
directorship are fully disclosed or known to the board or committee, and the bo,rd
or committee authorizes, approves or ratifies the contract or transaction in good faith
by a vote sufficient without counting the vote of the common director or directors or
the contract or transaction is approved by the shareholders (Section 153) in good
faith, or
(2) As to contracts or transactions not approved as provided in paragraph (1)
of this subdivision, the contract or transaction is just and reasonable as to the
corporation at the time it is authorized, approved or ratified.
This subdivision does not apply to contracts or transactions covered by sub-
division (a).
(c) Interested or common directors may be counted in determining the presence
of a quorum at a meeting of the board or a committee thereof which authorizes,
approves or ratifies a contract or transaction.
135 Id. The California model used the term financial interest. The requirements of the new
California statute that the interest be material are consistent with the policy underlying the rules
with regard to interested directors' transactions. Cf. Cary, supra note 86, at 410. The rationale
for the rule is "to secure faithful discharge of duty, and at the same time, to close the door as
far as possible against all temptations to do wrong." Indurated Concrete Corp. v. Abbott, 195
Md. 496, 74 A.2d 17, 20 (1950). Only a material financial interest might affect one's judg-
ment. A "might" test should be used to determine materiality as consistent with limiting
temptation. Thus materiality should not be a question only of actual amount of interest but
should consider other factors including the size of the corporation; the holdings of other
directors; the holdings of relatives and others associated with the director; the size of the
benefit to the director; etc. Section 310(a) specifically excludes mere common directorship as
meaning a material financial interest. In addition, the fact that a director who receives com-
pensation votes to fix the compensation of another director, will not be considered a material
financial interest.
136 California has adapted the Delaware approach of full disclosure of both interest and
material facts as to the entire transaction. See note 83 supra, for the other states requiring full
disclosure.
137 CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (a) (1).
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transaction also appears to be valid.'38 If the transaction is not approved
pursuant to the alternatives of board or shareholder approval, then the statute
requires that the person asserting the validity of the transaction must sustain the
burden of proving the fairness of the transaction at the time it was authorized,
approved, or ratified. 3 ' Thus if shareholder approval necessarily validates trans-
actions, the fairness requirement has been eliminated.
Transactions between interlocking boards of corporations where none of the
directors has a material financial interest fall under the second rule. As long as
there is full disclosure to the board and subsequent approval by the disinterested
directors acting in good faith, the transaction appears to be valid. 4 ' In the
alternative, the transaction appears to be valid if there is shareholder approval. 4
Only if there is no such board or shareholder approval, must the transaction be
established as "fair."'' Thus in the case of mere interlocks, fairness would not
be an issue if there were either board or shareholder approval pursuant to the
statute.
This new statute, contrary to the original California model, appears to be a
validating statute. There are several reasons for this conclusion. First, the title
of the statute specifically says "validity."'' Second, under the first rule there is
a specific requirement of fairness when only the board approves a transaction,
but not when there is shareholder approval; and there is no requirement of fair-
ness under the second rule when either the board or the shareholders approve.' 4
Thus fairness has been eliminated as an overall requirement because the express
inclusion of it in one case impliedly excludes it in all others.' Third, the legisla-
tive history indicates that each alternative under the statute is for validation. 40
Under the second rule, the elimination of fairness in the context of inter-
locking directors when there is board or shareholder approval seems justifiable.
Although the California model made no distinction between transactions with
interlocking directors and those between a corporation and its directors, the
138 Id. at § 310 (a) (2). Fairnesss under Remilard, supra note 42, was viewed at a later
date notwithstanding the statute. See note 66 supra. This may now preclude courts from
viewing fairness at a later date unless the courts in equity fear waste. Cf. Rogers, supra note
65, or view the statute as a codification of Remillard. See note 161 infra.
139 Id. at § 310 (a) (3).
140 Id. at § 310 (b) (1).
141 Id. The statute appears to eliminate the requirement of full disclosure to the share-
holders. Arguably the requirement of approval in good faith by the shareholders mandates such
disclosure.
142 Id. at § 310 (b) (2).
143 See SUTHERLAND, supra note 31, at § 47.03, 72-73. BLACK, supra note 31, at § 83,
244-52. Former CAL. GEN. CORP. CODE § 6 (West 1955), provided that the headings of the
sections do not affect the "scope, meaning or intent" of the Corporation code. The new Cali-
fornia General Corporation Law contains no similar provision, thus § 6 is repealed. BLACK, §
168. This would indicate an intent to give headings some meaning.
144 Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (a) (2) with (a) (1); and (b) (2) with (2) (1).
143 SUTHERLAND, supra note 31, at § 47.23. 123; BLACK, supra note 31 at § 72, 219.
146 California Legislative Assembly Select Committee on the Revision and the Corporation
Code. Report of the Assembly Select Committee on the Revision of the Corporation Code
54-55 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Select Report]. The Select Report states that, "[als in
prior law, alternative methods are stated to provide independent procedures for the validation
of "interested transactions" (emphasis supplied). Id. at 54. Note that prior law didn't provide
for alternative validation procedures. See Remillard, supra: note 42, and discussion in Part A
of text supra.
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common law often distinguished the two situations.14 This change in the new
California statute is sound because it is only applicable in cases where there are
common directors without a material financial interest in either corporation.
If the directors have a material financial interest, then the transaction falls under
the stricter first rule which requires fairness with board approval. The removal of
fairness under the second rule appears to be based upon the business reality that
certain individuals may sit on several boards as outside directors without a
financial interest. Moreover, this use of outside directors may serve definite bus-
iness advantages.14 The common law rule against contracts between a corpora-
tion and its director is inapplicable in this context since a director without a sub-
stantial financial interest will normally not be influenced by self-interest, and
thus will not unduly influence his board to enter into unfair contracts. 49
Under the first rule, however, the elimination of fairness may be unsound.
While there may be theoretical reasons to distinguish between approval by the
board or shareholders,'50 this statutory change is significant and may work to the
disadvantage of minority shareholders. The statute only requires approval by
"the affirmative vote of a majority of the shares entitled to vote," (interested
shareholders are not entitled to vote). 5 represented at a duly held meeting at
which a quorum is present.'52 A quorum is normally a majority of the shares
entitled to vote at a meeting.'53 Since the interested shares are not entitled to
vote" on the approval of the transaction, the quorum focuses upon a majority
of those entitled to vote on the issue.' 5 Section 602 (a) provides that this quorum
requirement may be varied and lowered to one third if provided for in the
certificate of incorporation.
The key is obtaining a majority of the disinterested shareholders which make
up the quorum. For example, suppose that a corporation with 99 shares issued
and outstanding, of which 33 shares are owned by interested directors, convenes
a shareholder meeting to affirm an interested directors' transaction. If there is a
provision in the certificate requiring a quorum of only one third of the share-
147 MARSH, supra note 9, at 41-42, 66; BALLANTINE supra note 10, § 72. See text accom-
panying notes 22-24 supra, for a discussion of common law.
148 See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trend in the Indemnification of
Corporation Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968), Myers & Pinto, Corporations,
1973-1974 N.Y.U. ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 485, 493-94.
149 See note 135 suf'ra, for a discussion of material financial interest.
150 It may be that the statute requires fairness for board approval because of the difficulty
in measuring the influence of the interested directors over the disinterested directors. MARSH,
supra note 9, at 37. It may be that removal of fairness in the context of shareholder approval
is recognition that the disinterested shareholders should be able to vote as they please and
ratify voidable transactions. But see Sneed, supra note 131, who argues that the shareholder
ratification rule rarely operated when there was unfairness.
151 § 310 (a) (1).
152 CAL. CORP. CODE § 153.
153 Id. at § 602(a).
154 CAL. CORP. § 310 (a).
155 CAL. CORP. § 112. Without this provision, arguably under § 602 (a) all that would
have been necessary at a meeting, which dealt with more than the issue of the interested trans-
action, would be a majority of all shareholders and thus interested shares could have been
counted for determination of the quorum. Under § 112, separate determinations must be made
of the quorum. One determination would require a majority of all shares to transact business.
The other would require only a majority of the disinterested shares when the interested trans-
action is dealt with.
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holders entitled to vote'56 and only 22 shares of disinterested shareholders are
represented, then the statute may serve to validate a transaction where only 12
shares out of a possible 66 were voted in favor of the transaction, i.e., a majority
of the disinterested shares represented at the meeting. The votes of these 12
shares completely eliminate the question of fairness from the court's consideration.
This problem is aggravated by increasing the outstanding shares when there is
limited attendance by disinterested shareholders.
This provision raises special problems in both the context of the closely held
corporation and the publicly held corporation. In the closely held corporation,
the principal shareholders may be family members. Under the first rule, it is
conceivable that an unfair transaction could be ratified by a majority of finan-
cially disinterested shareholders which are represented at the meeting consisting of
family held shares. 5 ' Thus a minority shareholder could be prejudiced unless
those shares could be disqualified.'
In the publicly held corporation, it is generally recognized that the proxy
machinery in the control of management precludes real decision-making on the
part of most shareholders. 9 In fact the SEC Proxy Rules specifically preclude
a shareholder from presenting counterproposals in management's proxy ma-
terial.' Thus, a shareholder would be required to solicit proxies at his own
expense to oppose the transaction.
The new California statute has codified the Remillard approach only in the
context of board approval, and not in the context of shareholder approval. 6'
Without fairness as an issue other grounds of attack must be used. One would
have to argue lack of full disclosure; or a lack of good faith; or that the transac-
tion were not subject to the shareholder ratification rule which as previously
156 If the amendment of the certificate to lower the quorum requirement is part of a plan to
have an interested transaction approved it may require compliance with the interested director's
statute. See broad definition of transaction in note 33 supra.
157 For example, a corporation with 100 shares of which the interested director owns 25
shares; his father owns 25 shares; his brother owns 25 shares; and another person owns 25
shares. An unfair contract could arguably be validated under the statute by the affirmative
votes of the director's father and brother without regard to fairness.
158 Arguably, family members may be included as interested under the statute and thus be
disqualified from voting. See note 34 supra. One may also argue breach of fiduciary duty of
the majority shareholders to the minority which may be more stringent in a closed corporation
context. See Donahue, supra note 117.
159 See M. EISENBERG, A STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION. A LEGAL ANALYSIS 97 (1976)
NADER, supra note 76, at 89. The S.E.C. recently announced a complete review of their proxy
rules because of a concern for the ineffectiveness of shareholder democracy. There may also be
a proposal to disallow the use of proxies by management. Hershey, SEC Plans Review of Rules
Governing Corporate Proxies, N.Y. Times 1 Apr. 28, 1977 at 1. Such a disallowance appears
justified when interested transactions are involved.
160 SEC Proxy Rule 14a-8 (a), 17 C.F.R. § 240, 14a-8 (a) (1974). One can argue that
the decision to use the proxy machinery itself in the context of a proposal to approve the trans-
action under the statute must also comply with the statute. The vote of the board to submit
the proposal may be viewed as a transaction. See the broad definition of transation in note 33
supra. Cf. EISENBERG, supra note 155, at 129. Since fairness is still required for such board
approval, then fairness in this context conceivably may require counterproposals which are
contrary to the proxy rules. Id. at 135-36.
161 The Select Report, supra note 146, at 55, indicates that the requirement of fairness with
board approval under the statute was intended to codify Remillard, supra note 42. But that
case involved a review of fairness when there had been interested shareholder approval, but no
board approval. Yet the holding that fairness is an overriding requirement of the statute would
also apply to board approval.
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discussed may amount to an indirect inquiry into fairness." 2
D. The Role of Fairness Under the Statutes
The previous discussion focused on the conflict between the California and
Delaware approaches and the changes wrought by the new California Statute.
The conflict centered on the treatment of substantive fairness as an overriding
requirement when testing the validity of interested directors' transactions, even
where the transaction was technically in compliance with the statute. If it is not
an overriding requirement, fairness can still be an important consideration under
the statutes as an alternative to board or shareholder approval.'
Commentators6 and courts.6 . view the requirement of fairness as sufficient
protection of the interests of shareholders. In addition, the fairness test, as op-
posed to the earlier inflexible common law rule which voided transactions merely
because of interest,'66 allows directors to engage in legitimate and desirable
activity with their corporation. 6 An evaluation of these assertions will be con-
sidered by examining the difficulties inherent in the fairness concept.
Courts have used various tests in determining what constitutes fairness. 6 '
In Pepper v. Litton, the Supreme Court indicates that the dealings between a
corporation and one in a fiduciary relationship
are subject to vigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engage-
ments with the corporation is challenged, the burden is on the director or
stockholder, not only to prove the good faith of the transaction, but also to
show inherent fairness-from the viewpoint of the corporation and those
interested therein. The essence of the test is whether or not under all the
circumstances the transaction covers the earmarks of an arms length
bargain.169
This classic and oft-quoted passage clearly sets forth the various elements of
fairness which later courts have developed and used. Each of these elements,
however, is difficult to apply. As a result, judicial development of the "fairness"
concept has little uniformity. Some courts have concentrated on the requirement
162 See text accompanying notes 108-122 supra, for limits on the Delaware Approach.
163 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (a) (3).
164 See, e.g., FORDHAm NOTE, supra note 47, at 661.
165 See, e.g., Shlensky v. South Parkway Building *Corp., 19 Ill.2d 268, 168 N.E.2d 793,
801 (1960).
166 See text accompanying notes 9-27 supra, for a discussion of common law.
167 BALLANTINE, supra note 10, at § 67, 171 indicates that: "it has been found impractical to
disqualify directors from any or all dealings with the corporation, for fear of possible dishonesty
or unfairness, when they may have the greatest interest in its welfare and may be willing to
deal with it upon reasonable terms. The policy of facilitating business has prevailed over the
policy of removal of temptation."
168 Courts have used the terms "fairness" (see, e.g., Remillard, supra note 42), "inherent
fairness" (see, e.g., Pepper, supra note 51), and "intrinsic fairness" (see, e.g., Sinclair Oil
Corporation, supra note 124). Arguably, "fairness" is a broader concept viewing the transac-
tion both procedurally and substantively; while the other concepts seem to focus on the terms
of the transaction, i.e., substantive fairness. Courts using these terms do not seem to articulate
any distinction.
169 Pepper, supra note 51, at 306-07.
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of good faith, 7 ' and one court even appears to have equated it with fairness.'
The "good faith" standard is problematic since it is unclear whether good faith
should be viewed subjectively (the intention of the parties) or objectively (con-
sideration of the contractual terms). If viewed subjectively, the actual belief
or state of mind of the parties must be proven; while if one follows an objective
standard, subjective protestations as to belief are not considered. In either case,
however, the fairness of the transaction is relevant to the issue of good faith. 72
As a result, the good faith standard reduces to a tautology: Fairness is a function
of good faith, which is determined by examining the fairness of the transaction.
In other words, fairness itself may be a necessary element in proving good faith.
Thus, good faith cannot be a useful test for determining fairness.
Other courts have focused their attention on the "arms-length bargain"
test.' Under this test, it is the function of the court to determine whether the
terms agreed to are within the range of terms that two parties with approximate
bargaining equality would accept.7 4 This test is difficult to apply because of the
practical problem of finding a similar context to determine appropriate com-
parative values.' The arms-length bargain test has been criticized as being in-
appropriate in the parent-subsidiary context, because that situation does not lend
itself to bargaining.
7 6
The concept of fraud has also been used as an equivalent to the fairness
concept.'77 If fraud in this context means actual fraud, then the court must find
a wrongful intent on the part of the interested director. This places a heavy
burden upon a plaintiff trying to set aside an "unfair" transaction. 7 1 Some
courts have been willing to dispense with the requirement of showing wrongful
170 See cases cited in YALE. NOTE, supra note 51, at 342.
171 Remillard, supra note 42.
172 See text accompanying notes 116-20 supra. See KANSAS NOTE, supra note 47, at 665-66.
173 Austrian et al. v. Williams et al., 103 F. Supp. 64, 75 (S.D.N.Y., 1952). See also
Ewen v. Peoria v. E. Ry. Co., 78 F. Supp. 312, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y., 1948).
174 YALE NOTE, supra note 51, at 340.
175 Ewen, supra note 173. The court indicates that the arm's length bargain test may be
the "ideal principle, if only it were in practice capable of application." See also HARVARD
NOTE, supra note 48, at 337-39. Cf. Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S. 2d 657 (1941) aff'd mem.,
263 App. Div. 814, 32 N.Y.2d 131 (1941): Comparative valuation would especially be a
problem in the closed corporation context. Cf. F. O'NEAL, SQUEEZE OUTS OF MINORITY SHARE-
HOLDERS, § 2.16 (1975).
176 Ewen, supra note 173. In Ewen, the arm's length bargain test was found inappropriate
and instead, the court looked at the parameters of the deal to see if the subsidiary "would
have been unwilling to accept less" and the parent "would have been unwilling to give mcre."
Id. at 317. See also YALE NOTE, supra note 51, at 340, which argues that the test "ignores the
economic leverage and decision-making powers possessed by the control group." The YALE
NOTE maintains that shareholders' expectations in the context of parent-subsidiaries do not
require a fairness test at the time of the transaction, but fairness should be viewed at the time and
under the circumstances when the relationship of parent-subsidiary was "entered into or perhaps
as of the last time when the complainant had a realistic chance of ending his participation
therein," i.e., an "expectations test." Id. at 351. But see VIRGINIA NOTE, supra note 14,
which argues against the fairness test and the expectations test and instead emphasizes an
"advantage-disadvantage test." See Sinclair Oil Corp., supra note 124, at which in a parent-
subsidiary context, the court initially used an "advantage-disadvantage test" which focused on
the receipt of benefits to the exclusion of the subsidiary. If there was such an advantage to
the parent company, then the court applied an intrinsic fairness test. Sinclair has been criti-
cized in Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,
680-81 (1974). "
177 YALE NOTE, supra note 49, at 341; VIRGINIA NOTE, supra note 12, at 1229.
178 Id. at 341. Those courts using actual fraud as the test have rarely found in favor of the
plaintiff. VIRGINIA NOTE at 1229 n.38.
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intent by invoking the doctrine of constructive fraud.' But exactly when a court
will be willing to invoke the doctrine of constructive fraud seems impossible to
forecast because of the difficulty, of defining the concept.' After examining the
cases in which the doctrine had been defined, one writer concluded that "the
results failed to fall into a discernable pattern."''
These tests used to determine fairness have a common weakness inherent in
the concept of fairness itself. They are not subject to precise definition because
they involve a primarily factual and circumstantial inquiry.' Thus, judges
reviewing transactions would be called upon to make business judgments. 8 To
further confuse matters, courts have often used some of these tests in "compli-
mentary pairs" such as "fraud and constructive fraud" or "fraud and the arms
length test," or "good faith and fairness."'8 4
Because of the conceptual problems posed by the fairness test, the burden
179 Id. at 342; see, e.g., Efron v. Kalmanovitz, supra note 119, at 157. According to the
court, "Constructive fraud comprises all acts, omissions and concealments involving breach of
legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence, and resulting in damage to another."
180 Id. "Fraud assumes so many shapes that courts and authors have been cautious in
attempting to define it. Each case must be considered on its own facts."
181 YALE NOTE, supra note 51, at 342.
182 Austrian v. Williams, 103 F. Supp. 64, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). As Ward, supra note 74,
at 112, points out, "[u]sually the court will outline the facts of the case and then, after declar-
ing the transaction fair or unfair, will paraphrase one of the above generalities as authority
for its decision."
183 In Heller, supra note 175, Judge Collins articulates the problems faced by courts in
determining fairness:
Assuming, arguendo, that the compensation should be revised, what yardstick is to be
employed? Who or what is to supply the measuring rod? The conscience of equity?
Equity is but another name for a human being temporarily judicially robed. He is
not omnipotent or omniscient. Can equity be so arrogant as to hold that it knows
more about managing this corporation than its stockholders?
Yes, the Court possesses the power to prune these payments, but openness forces
the confession that the pruning would be synthetic and artificial rather than analytic
or scientific. Whether or not it would be fair and just is highly dubious. Yet,
merely because the problem is perplexing is no reason for eschewing it. It is not
timidity, however, which perturbs me. It is finding a rational or just gauge for
revising these figures were I inclined to do so. No blueprints are furnished. The
elements to be weighed are incalculable; the imponderables, manifold. To act out of
whimsy or caprice or arbitrariness would be more than inexact-it would be the
prime antithesis of justice; it would be a farce.
If comparisons are to be made, with whose compensation are they to be made-
executives? Those connected with the motion picture industry, radio artists? Justices
of the Supreme Court of the United States? The President of the United States?
Manifestly, the material at hand is not of adequate plasticity for fashioning into a
pattern or standard. Many instances of positive underpayment will come to mind,just as instances of apparent rank overpayment abound. Haplessly, intrinsic worth
is not always the criterion. A classic perhaps might produce trifling compensation
for its author, whereas a popular novel might yield a titanic fortune. Merit is" not
always commensurately rewarded, whilst mediocrity sometimes unjustly brings in-
credibly lavish returns. Nothing is so divergent and contentious and inexplicable
as values.
Courts are ill equipped to solve or even to grapple with these entangled economic
problems. Indeed, their solution is not within the juridical province.
Courts are concerned that corporations be honestly and fairly operated by its
directors, with the observance of the formal requirements of the law; but what is
reasonable compensation for his officers is primarily for the stockholders.
184 VmGiNIA NoTs, supra note 14, at 1231.
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of proof is of critical importance. 8 ' By placing the burden on one party, courts
can conclude that it has not been met without articulating the reasons a transac-
tion is fair or unfair. 8 ' Additionally, many transactions may not be characterized
clearly "fair," or "unfair." Thus, the allocation of the burden of proof would
often be determinative of the litigation itself. 7
The elusive character of the fairness concept and the differing standards
courts apply leave the validity of prospective transactions uncertain. This un-
certainty neither adequately protects shareholders nor does it necessarily en-
courage the legitimate activity of directors. Under the test, a transaction may be
upheld as valid even though it may not be the best deal indepefident directors
would have bargained for, thus sacrificing shareholder interests.'88 The un-
certainty of the fairness test may also restrain a director from entering into
legitimate transactions with a corporation. Yet it may, because of a fear that it
will be voided, also encourage some directors to engage in abusive self-dealing
because the uncertainty may allow or encourage a dishonest director to gamble
on the uncertainty.'89
In addition to the problems of the uncertainty of the fairness test, the oc-
casions on which such transactions are questioned may be rare. A corporation is
unlikely to bring a suit to rescind a transaction with one of its directors. Only
with a change in management does the possibility of an action increase.' As a
result, the shareholder derivative suit is often the only practical way to challenge
interested director transactions. These difficulties, procedural .as well as sub-
stantive, may in fact immunize most transactions. 9 '
Even though the fairness concept engenders these difficulties in application,
it remains the one method by which courts can scrutinize transactions to protect
the minority shareholders. It represents a balance between the strict voidability
rule of the earlier common law and the pro-management concepts of the business
judgment rule. The possibility that a transaction may be challenged will force
management and the directors to themselves carefully scrutinize interested
directors' transactions. It thus remains a necessary concept, despite its limitations.
In the context of the publicly-held corporation there have been suggestions
185 Cf. Ewen, supra note 173, at 317. If the burden is one seeking to void the transaction,
it may be an insurmountable burden. Note, The Nonratification Rule and the Demand Re-
quirement: The Case for Limited judicial Review, 63 COL. L. REV. 1086, 1102 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Nonratification Rule].
186 See, e.g., Stadley v. Pine Island Cooperative Association, 21 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1962).
187 Ward, supra note 74, at 112. See quote in note 179 supra. See text accompanying
notes 70-75 supra, for a discussion of burden of proof.
188 FORDHAM NOTE, supra note 47, at 663-64; MARSH, supra note 9, at 57. This uncer-
tainty allows jurisdiction with a bias towards management to potentially manipulate the
concept in favor of management. This bias is exported to other states either through the Consti-
tution's Full Faith and Credit Clause (U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1) or through a rule of conflicts.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 809. But see Western Airlines Inc. v.
Sobieski, 191 Cal. App.2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
189 Id. at 663-64.
190 MARSH, supra note 9, at 55.
191 For example, posting security for expenses (see, e.g., N.J.S.A. 14A:3-6 (3); allegation of
contemporaneous ownership (see, e.g., FED. RULES Civ. PRoc. rule 23.1(1), 28 U.S.C.A.);
Possible payment of the corporation's attorney fees (see, e.g., N.J.S.A. 14A:3-6(2); require-
ment of demand on directors (see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 834(2)) and shareholders (see,
e.g., FED. RULES Civ. Pioc. rule 23.1, 28 U.S.C.A.). See also Note Nonratification Rule;
Comment, Shareholder Validation of Directors' Frauds: The-Non-Ratification Rule v. The
Business Judgment Rule, 58 Nw. U. L. REv. 807 (1964).
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that Federal regulation 92 or requiring full disclosure"9' may protect shareholders.
In the absence of congressional action on these proposals, the fairness concept
under state law is increasingly significant. Given the current predilection of the
Supreme Court to limit access to the Federal courts and to narrow the scope of
Rule 10b(5) ;.94 the proxy rules,'95 and the insider trading rules, 99 rights and
remedies under state law are becoming more important. In view of the poten-
tially broad scope of these statutes,'97 the fairness requirement under state law
may provide a remedy for aggrieved shareholders which is not available under
federal law.
In the context of small corporations, fairness remains of even greater im-
portance. Neither disclosure nor federal regulation is of assistance in this setting.
The realities of small businesses often require transactions between directors and
their corporation. Thus the fairness requirement is essential in this context to
avoid the oppression of minority shareholders.
In both situations-publicly or closely held corporation-the fairness test
admittedly has its weaknesses. Application of a concept which is subject to such
varying interpretation leads almost inevitably to decisions which are apparently
inconsistent. This inconsistency makes prediction of the validity of individual
transactions very difficult. However, the test also has one great strength; it retains
for the courts the measure of discretion necessary to protect shareholders from
voiceless submission to potentially harmful interested directors' transactions.
IV. Conclusion
This article has focused on the effect of the statutory responses to interested
directors' transactions. Such transactions are permissible under the majority of
state statutes if they are either approved by the board or shareholders or if they
are found to be fair. The disjunctive phrasing of the statute would appear to
eliminate fairness as a consideration wherever there was approval. The removal
of fairness as a factor in validating a challenged transaction would be a
significant departure from the common law's zealous protection of the minority
shareholder. Because of the limited scope of federal relief available in this area,
state law is very important. The California statute and its progeny all treated the
two factors of approval and fairness in the disjunctive, yet the courts have con-
tinued to consider fairness as an issue when examining the interested directors'
transactions. Even if some courts adopt the disjunctive approach, however, the
limits which can be placed upon the operation of either the business judgment
rule or the shareholder ratification rule, arguably reduce to questions of fairness.
192 Marsh, supra note 9, at 74-75; Nader, supra note 76.
193 Cary, supra note 86.
194 See, e.g., Green, supra note 6; Ernst, supra note 128; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
195 See, e.g., TSC Industries v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
196 See, e.g., Foremost-McKesson Inc-, v. Provident Securities Co., 96 S. 'Ct. 508 (1976)
Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973); Reliance
Electronic Co. v. Emerson Electronic Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
197 See note 33 supra.
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The new (1977) California statute appears to finally eliminate fairness only
in the context of interlocking boards and disinterested shareholder approval by
limiting fairness as a consideration to those transactions without disinterested
shareholder approval or transactions where the directors on the interlocking
boards had a substantial financial interest. This, however, could lead to the
oppression of minority shareholders. In order to avoid this, the courts should
continue to scrutinize the approval of the transactions to be sure of more than
just technical compliance with the statute. This can be done if the fairness
doctrine has some continuing validity despite its apparent elimination by the
statute. The doctrine has proven its value through both a long tradition in com-
mon law and also continued application by the courts in the face of apparent
statutory elimination. Until there is some effective alternative, the courts must
retain the fairness test in examining interested directors' transactions.
